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SANDIN V. CONNER AND INTRAPRISON
CONFINEMENT: TEN YEARS OF
CONFUSION AND HARM IN PRISONER
LITIGATION
Abstract: The 1995 United States Supreme Court case of Saudin u Conner
.dramatically altered how federal courts examine prisoners' procedural
clue process claims. Prior to Sandia. a prison official's act against a
prisoner in violation of a specific regulation often gave rise to a liberty
interest worthy of procedural clue process protection. Sandin ended this
analysis by stating that the proper inquiry should focus on whether such a
violation caused an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." This Note argues that
the "atypical and significant" standard, as applied by the majority of the
lower courts, has led to harsh results, particularly for prisoners claiming
that their assignments to higher levels of intraprison confinement
followed little or no process. Because intraprison confinement is not.
representative of the prisoner experience and often harms inmates,
courts must recognize such confinements to be the "atypical and
significant" experiences that they truly are.
INTRODUCTION
The 1995 case of Sandin v. Conner is the most recent United States
Supreme Court case to address significantly the legal standards courts
apply to prisoners making a claim of deprivation of liberty under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' For the twenty
years prior to Sandi'', the Supreme Court recognized that a prisoner
possessed liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause if the
prisoner could point to a specific state or federally created right that
prison officials had violated. 2 The Sandin decision was most influential
See 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); see also U.S. CoNs•r. amend. XIV, § 1 (No state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."). Generally,
prisoners asserting a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights bring suit under
Title 42, § 1983 of the U.S. Code, which provides a means for people to seek damages or
injunctive relief when their constitutional rights are violated by those acting tinder color of
state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see also KAREN M. BLUM & KATHRYN R. URBONYA,
FEDJUDICIAI. CM., SEC11ON 1983 LITIGATION 1 (1998).
2 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-72 (1983) (holding inmate acquired a
protected liberty interest in remaining in the prison's general population, given the exis-
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for ending this method of analysis, by instructing courts not to look
toward objective, codified state law to identify what liberty interests a
prisoner may possess. 3 Instead, the Court stated that the relevant in-
quiry must focus on the nature of the deprivation imposed on a pris-
oner. 4 After Sandin, regardless of what is stated in a statute or regula-
tion, if the nature of the deprivation does not impose an "atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary inci-
dents of prison life," the prisoner will not have a liberty interest in
avoiding the deprivation. 5 As a consequence, in situations where no
liberty interest is found to exist, the process by which such depriva-
tions occur will not he worthy of any procedural due process protec-
don from the courts.°
This Note focuses on how the Sandin "atypical and significant"
standard has negatively affected the ability of prisoners to make liberty
interest claims arising from intraprison sentences to more restrictive
confinement, usually involving long-term segregation.' Sandin directed
lower courts to focus on the nature of the deprivation a prisoner expe-
riences in prison and to compare such a deprivation to what is typical
of prison life. 8 Based on the case's vague language and its explicitly
stated policy of deference to prison officials, however, the lower courts
have applied Sandin in a manner that very much ignores the nature of
a prisoner's deprivation as compared to the average prisoner's experi-
ence and overlooks the severe harms segregatory confinements cause. 9
Thus, the majority of post-Sandin prisoner liberty interest cases have
resulted in findings that sentences to solitary confinement will never
raise liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.°
The policy behind such a jurisprudential development is clear."
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the Sandia Court, stated
tence of Pennsylvania statutes and regulations setting forth strict procedures for confining
an inmate to segregation); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,557-58 (1974) (holding that,
where a state creates a right and recognizes that it can only be deprived as a result of seri-
ous misconduct, a prisoner's interest is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amend-
ment 'liberty' to entitle him to those minimum procedures ... required by the Due Proc-
ess Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated").
3 Sce 515 U.S. at 483-84.
4 See id. at 481-84.
5 See id. at 483-84.
6 See id.
7 See infra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
8 See 515 U.S. at 484,486.
9 See infra notes 234-333 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
" See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-83.
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that the "atypical and significant" standard was necessary to give defer-
ence back to prison administrators who for years had been subject to
lawsuits any time a prisoner could point to a violation of positive law."
He also wrote that the pre-Sandin liberty interest analysis had over-
burdened federal courts with unmeritorious prisoner claim0 Thus,
Sandhi can be seen as calling for both judicial efficiency and restraint in
the area of prisoner litigation,"
However justified the policy behind Sandin, the results of the deci-
sion in terms of how the federal courts of appeals have applied the
case's standard have been disastrous for prisoners. 3
 Today, it is clear
that prison officials have the power to sentence prisoners to segrega-
tory living arrangements for either punitive or non-punitive reasons,
without f011owing any procedural standards whatsoever. 16
 State and
federal prison guidelines outlining such procedures can be violated
without concern: because prisoners possess no liberty interest in staying
out of such confinements, courts will rarely if ever examine the consti-
tutionality of the procedures prison officials utilize."
12
 See hi, at 481-84.
" See M. at 482-83.
14 See id.
12 Sec infra notes 150-233 and accompanying (ext.
la See infra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
1 ? See infirt notes 150-233 and accompanying text. Once a court identifies a protected
liberty or property interest, it must examine the process that accompanies the deprivation
of that interest and decide whether the protected safeguards built into the process are
constitutionally adequate. See Bd. of Regents of State Colts. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564.569-70,
570 n.7 (1972). Pre-Sandin, the U.S. Supreme Court, on two noteworthy occasions, act-
dressed the sufficiency of the procedural safeguards owed prisoners demonstrating viable
liberty interests arising out of assignments to intraprison confinement, with the Court
making distinctions between the procedures due prisoners sentenced to disciplinary seg-
regation versus those sentenced to non-disciplinary segregation. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563—
67,571 n,19 (stating that prisoners with protected liberty interests arising out of sentences
to disciplinary segregation must be provided with advance written notice of both the
charges and the basis for them, an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence at a
hearing, and a written decision and summary of the evidence from the decision-making
body); Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 475-77 (holding that where a prisoner has a liberty interest aris-
ing out of a sentence to non-disciplinary, or "administrative" confinement, the procedures
required are less stringent than in a Woyftype setting, with prison officials required to
provide some notice" of the charges and to allow the prisoner ''an opportunity to present
his views" in an "informal, nonadversary" setting that need not occur before transfer). The
Sandin Court did not reach a discussion of what procedural safeguards satisfy due process
in the intraprison confinement context, however, because the prisoner in Sandhi failed to
assert a liberty interest in the first place. See 515 U.S. at 487, Thus, post-Sandin, sonic courts
have questioned whether the disciplinary/non-disciplinary distinction is still a viable one,
given that the Sandin Court essentially conflated disciplinary and non-disciplinary
confinement throughout its liberty interest analysis. See Koch v. Lewis, 96 F. Stipp. 2d 949,
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This Note argues that the lower federal courts have given too
much weight to Sandin's stated policy justifications and as a result have
largely avoided honest inquiries into typical prison life. 18 These courts
make assumptions that the nature of solitary confinement is typical of
the everyday prison experience, but rarely do such courts attempt to
support such assumptions with objective evidence. 19 In addition, there
is almost no discussion in the lower courts as to the harmful psycho-
logical effects that indefinite solitary confinement can have on prison-
ers.20 This lack of discussion demonstrates that the lower federal courts
largely have chosen to disregard suggestions that the effects of solitary
confinement should be considered significant.21
Part I of this Note reviews the history of modern prisoner litiga-
tion in the United States, from the mid-twentieth century to Sandia in
1995. 22 This Part also addresses the major developments in the Su-
preme Court's Due Process Clause jurisprudence relevant to the pris-
oners' rights discussion. 23 Part II discusses the Sandhi decision and
examines the case's language, methodology, and policy.24 Part III ana-
lyzes how the lower courts have applied the Sandin holding in a vari-
ety of ways. 26 This Part also demonstrates how these differing meth-
odologies have usually led to tough results for prisoners. 26 Finally, Part
IV discusses why lower courts have failed to apply a true "atypical and
significant" standard and argues that a more honest application of
Sandia, would result in courts looking closer both at what is truly rep-
resentative of the prison experience and at the damaging results of
long-term solitary confinement. 27
964 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("[A]fter Sandia, distinguishing between disciplinary and administra-
tive actions for purposes of defining the level of process owed a prisoner is problematic, if
not inappropriate."); see also 515 U.S. at 486; infra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
Other courts have continued to follow pre-Sandin precedent in this area. See, e.g., McClary
v. Kelly, 4 F. Stipp. 2d 195,212-13 (W.D.N.Y 1998) (stating that Sandia "did not revamp
the requirements of due process once a liberty interest has been implicated" and analyzing
the process due a prisoner assigned to administrative confinement under the standards
outlined in Hewitt).
111 See infra notes 234-333 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 234-333 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 234-333 and accompanying text.
21 See infia notes 234-333 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 28-107 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 41-107 and accompanying text.
2'' 	 infra notes 108-144 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 145-233 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 145-233 and accompanying text.
27 Sec infra notes 234-333 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORY
A. The Hands-Off Doctrine and the Initial Recognition of Prisoners' Rights
The ability of prisoners to bring claims in federal courts is a recent
development in American history, largely due to the federal judiciary's
long-lasting reluctance to recognize a prisoner's right to litigate. 28 Until
the mid-twentieth century, federal courts handled prisoners and their
corresponding claims through the application of the "hands-off doc-
trine," which viewed the methods prison administrators utilized in
managing prisoners as not falling within the jurisdiction of the courts. 29
This approach granted absolute deference to prison officials in their
operation of the penal system and relegated inmates to the functional
equivalent of non-citizens." The control of prisoners' lives thus lay in
the hands of the executive and legislative branches, unchecked by any
significant judicial control."
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a prisoner's
right of access to the federal courts in 1941, marking a first step away
from an absolutist application of the hands-off doctrine. 32 In Ex parte
Hull, the Court acknowledged a prisoner's right to slate a claim in
federal court through the filing of a habeas corpus petition alleging
illegal custody." The prison officials in Hull prevented the plaintiff, a
Michigan state prisoner, from filing his habeas petition on numerous
occasions.34 The officials argued that a state regulation granted them
the authority to determine if legal papers were properly drawn before
delivering them to court." The Court declared the regulation invalid,
ruling that the judiciary alone possessed the authority to decide if a
prisoner's legal documents were adequately constructed."
Hull was the first of a number of cases in which the Supreme
Court limited the discretion of prison officials by reversing prison
policies, whether based on codified regulations or not, that had the
28 See Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and the Supreme
Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REv. 1229, 1238 (1998).
25 See id.
Sec id. at 1238-39.
31 See id. at 1239.
32 See Ira P. Robbins, The Thisonets'	 Box and the Evolution of Federal Inmate Rights, 144
F.R.D. 127, 152 (1993); see also Herman, supra note 28, at 1239.
33 See 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
34 Id. at 547-98.
33 Id.
36
 Id. at 549.
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effect of curbing a prisoner's ability to state a claim in federal court."
Hull and its progeny largely dealt with the constitutional question of
whether states could restrict prisoners from accessing the federal
courts.38 The Supreme Court responded that such restrictions were
unconstitutional, largely relying on the rights inherent in the Habeas
Corpus Clause." In addition to expanding the right of prisoners to
access federal courts throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, this period
also saw the Court expanding what types of claims prisoners would be
allowed to assert once they had reached the courthouse.°
B. Rights Expansion and the Due Process Clause
In 1964, in Cooper v. Pale, the U.S. Supreme Court made it pos-
sible for prisoner claims to survive that were not dependent on is-
sues arising out of habeas corpus and illegal custody.'" In Cooper, the
Court reversed a lower court decision dismissing a prisoner's suit
alleging that officials had punished him for his religious beliefs. 42 At
least one scholar has observed that, with Cooper, the Court began to
indicate that the Constitution accords prisoners, like all people, cer-
tain guaranteed rights, and that the judiciary cannot limit the ability
of prisoners to vindicate those rights if they are disturbed. 49 Follow-
ing Cooper, a "prisoners' rights revolution" ensued in which the
Court decided a number of cases expanding the rights that prison-
ers could assert under the Constitution.'" These decisions began to
define the constitutional rights of prisoners under the First, 43
37 See, e.g., Johnson r. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969) (invalidating state regulation
that restricted legal assistance from other inmates); Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340
U.S. 206, 208-09 (1951) (disallowing state prison officials from preventing an inmate from
filing an appeal); cf. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (reaffirming right of pris-
oners to have access to legal materials).
38 See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-22, 828; Avery, 393 U.S. at 485-86; Dowd, 340 U.S. at 208-
09; Hull, 312 U.S. at 549.
39 See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-22, 828; Avery, 393 U.S. at 485-87, 490; Hull, 312 U.S. at
549. The Habeas Corpus Clause provides: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, sinless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may re-
quire it." U.S. CoNsT. art. I. § 9, cl. 2.
49 Sec Barbara Belbot, Where Can a Prisoner Find a Liberty Interest These Days? The Pains of
Imprisonment Escalate, 42 N.Y.L. Scit, L. Rev. 1, 1 (1998).
41 See 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam).
42 Id.
43 See Belbot, supra note 40. at 1; sec also Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546.
44 See Belbot. supra note 40, at 1-2.
43 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (restricting ability of officials
to censor prisoner mail); Cruz v. Betel. 405 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1972) (upholding the right
to practice religion in prison).
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Eight11,46 and Fourteenth Amendments.47 Although far from putting
prisoners on the same level as non-incarcerated citizens, such cases
limited the power of the state to control the lives of prisoners." They
also gave back to prisoners the abilities to communicate more freely,
to practice religion, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
and most important to this Note, to receive due process prior to the
revocation of their liberty interests while in prison."
The Court came to develop its Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence in the area of prisoners' rights in the context of the larger due
process "revolution" that. began in the early 1970s." Consequently,
prior to examining how the courts began to apply the Due Process
Clause to prisoners, it is necessary to understand the key legal devel-
opments behind the dramatic changes in the Supreme Court's under-
standing and application of the Fourteenth Amendment in general."
1. The Due Process Revolution
Before 1970, due process was constitutionally required only in
situations where the government attempted to dispossess a person of
one's "rights," consisting of traditional property interests such as money
or a house, in addition to certain liberty interests the Bill of Rights pro-
tected. 52 A person facing the withdrawal of such rights was permitted
"some kind of hearing," but such procedural protection did not attach
to the revocation of what can generally be described as "non-
46 Sec Hutto 8'. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (upholding finding that conditions in
prison's isolation cells violated prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment "establishes the government's
obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration").
47 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539. 557-58 (1974) (holding that where a state cre-
ates a right and recognizes that it can only be deprived as a result of serious misconduct, a
prisoner's interest "is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' to enti-
tle him to those minimum procedures required by the Due Process Clause to insure that
the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated"); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972) (holding that the revocation of one's status as a parolee gives rise to a liberty interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment that must be met by procedural safeguards).
45 See generally Herman, sepia note 28. at 1229.
46 See Hello, 437 U.S. at 687; WWI 418 U.S. at 557-58; Procunim 416 U.S. at 408-09;
Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322-23; Herman. supra note 28, at 1242-43.
66 Sec Richard J. Pierce, The Due Ptvccss Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 Coium. L.
Rev. 1973, 1973 (1996).
51 See infm notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
64 See Pierce, supra note 50, at 1974.
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traditional" properly interests, or "privileges," such as government em-
ployment or statutory benefits."
The U.S. Supreme Court eviscerated this analytical divide in
1970, in Goldberg v. Kelly, when the Court applied the Due Process
Clause to a situation in which the government revoked an individual's
welfare benefits." The Goldberg Court, acknowledging that "[m] uch of
the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that do not
fall within traditional common-law concepts of property," stated that
welfare benefits are more similar to traditional property interests and
less like mere gratuities." After making these observations, the Court
then concluded that due process required a hearing before termina-
tion of such benefits. 56 As the government did not challenge the fact
that the withdrawal of benefits called for elements of due process, the
Court did not focus on addressing why, specifically, welfare benefits
were deserving of such protection. 57
In 1972, in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the U.S. Su-
preme Court clarified the connection between the entitlement to
procedural clue process protection and non-traditional property and
liberty interests. 58 In Roth, the Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that
due process required a state university to provide him with a hearing
before it decided to discontinue his employment.59 The Court noted
that the conditions of the plaintiff's employment, along with the rele-
vant state statutes and regulations, did not call for such a hearing.°
Thus, the plaintiff lacked a property interest in his position strong
enough to compel the university to conduct a hearing before it made
its decision.61 In its analysis, the Roth Court cited Goldberg for the
proposition that property interests encompass more than what was
considered property under the common law. 62 Moreover, the Court
stated that, in deciding whether a property interest was worthy of due
process protection before its revocation, the Court would look not to
one's subjective expectations but to whether the interest arose out of
53 See id. (quoting Woyf, 418 U.S. at 557-58).
54 See 397 U.S. 254,261-63 (1970); Pierce, supra note 50, at 1977-78.
" See 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
56 Sec id. at 264.
57 Sec id. at 261-63; Belbot, supra note 40, at 8.
58 See 408 U.S. 564.577-78 (1972).
59 Id. at 568-69.
69
 Id. at 578.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 571-72,576-77.
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a specific, codified law.° The Court suggested that such property in-
terests would be found not in the Constitution, but in existing rules
arising from objective sources such as state law."
The Roth Court also discussed' whether the university violated the
plaintiff's liberty interests in a manner requiring due process protec-
tion.° The Court reasoned that under the Constitution, liberty inter-
ests must be conceived of broadly, indicating that such interests are not
limited to what can be found in codified law.° Instead, liberty interests
encompass basic freedoms stitch as the rights to work, to contract, and
to practice religion.° Because the Roth plaintiffs termination did not.
damage his ability to procure future employment, the plaintiff had not.
asserted the violation of a liberty interest requiring due process protec-
tion.° Thus, the Court in Roth created a basic analytical distinction
between liberty and property interests within the context of adjudicat-
ing clue process claims: property interests, though not limited to tradi-
tional, common-law interests, must be based on a real expectation
likely tied to objective law, whereas liberty interests will be defined
more broadly and involve basic impediments to one's ability to live
freely.° Although courts began to apply this developing due process
analysis to cases asserting a deprivation of liberty in the prison context,
they soon rejected it in favor of a more pragmatic approach that
looked to objective law in the adjudication of such claims."
2. Prisoners and the Due Process Clause
In 1972, in Morrissey v. Broiler; the U.S. Supreme Court discussed
for the first. time the liberty interests of convicted prisoners, using the
new due process analysis. 7 ' In Morrissey, the police arrested the plain-
tiff, a parolee, revoked his parole status, and sent him back to prison
without a hearing. 72 The Court. addressed the question of whether
due process required a hearing before the plaintiffs parolee status
could be revoked properly." The Court held that the Constitution
63 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77.
64 See id. at 577.
65
 See id. at 573.
06 See id. at 572.
67 See id.
66 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74.
69 See id. at 572-78.
70 See infra notes 71-107 and accompanying text.
71 Sec 408 U.S. at 481-82.
72 Id. at 472-73.
75 Id. at 472.
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required clue process protection in such a situation. 74 In coining to
this conclusion, the Court noted that parolees have a liberty interest
in remaining free from restraint while abiding lawfully by the terms of
their parole, and that parolees put their trust in a "promise," albeit an
"implicit" one, that they will remain free while doing so. 75 Consistent
with the Roth analysis, the Morrissey Court reasoned that this promise
did not. arise out of state law or codified state regulations defining pa-
role revocation procedures (an approach that, under Roth, the Court
would apply if the state had revoked one's property interest), but in-
stead arose out of the meaning of liberty within the Due Process
Clause itself. 76 The Court further noted that parolees, unlike incar-
cerated inmates, lawfully can seek employment and spend unre-
stricted time with friends and family, rights that factor into one's lib-
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Only two years later in 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court in Wolff v.
McDonnell collapsed Roth's separate property and liberty analyses as
applied in the prison context, creating in its wake the "state-created
liberty interest doctrine," which for the next twenty years would apply
to the majority of cases in which prisoners claimed a violation of a lib-
erty interest without clue process. 78 This development would be both a
blessing and a curse for prisoners.79 The plaintiff in Wolff asserted a
challenge to the disciplinary procedures within a Nebraska state
prison, 80 Pursuant to statute, prisoners that behaved adequately would
be granted "good-time credits" by the prison, which had the effect of
reducing the prisoners' overall term of imprisonment.° The prison
also had the power to take back awarded credits upon a finding that
the inmate was guilty of flagrant misconduct.82 The plaintiff in Wolff
argued that the process set up within the prison that found him guilty
of a significant violation, resulting in the forfeiture of his credits and
thus the lengthening of his sentence, was constitutionally inadequate
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 83
74 Id. at 482.
75 Id.
76 See Monissey, 408 U.S. at 481-82; see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-78.
77
 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481-82.
76 See 418 U.S. at 556-58; Belbot, supra note 40, at 14-16; infra notes 97-107 and ac-
companying text.
' See Herman, supra note 28, at 1255.
8° 418 U.S. at 542-43.
al Sec id. at 546 n.6, 546-47.
62 Id. at 546-47.
88 See id. at 553 & n.11.
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In deciding whether the plaintiff had indeed asserted the viola-
tion of a liberty interest which would then require due process protec-
tion, the Court in Wolff did not analyze the plaintiff's liberty interest
under the broad, amorphous standards seen in Roth and Morrissey. 84
Instead, the Court noted that the right to good-time credits was cre-
ated pursuant to Nebraska state law.8' Following this observation, the
Court reasoned that because the state established such a right and
codified the rule that such credits could only he lost as a result of se-
rious violations, the state had granted the prisoner a liberty interest of
"real substance."86 Consequently, the plaintiff was deserving of clue
process sufficient to "insure that the state-created right [was] not arbi-
trarily abrogated."87 By this ruling, the Court made a bold statement
that would have a major effect on future prisoner litigation: prisoners
have liberty interests created by state law that are equally as deserving
of clue process protection as those arising from the notion of liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment . 88
Thus, the Court in Wolff defined a prisoner's "liberty" interest by
looking to objective state law—just as the Court in Roth had done two
years earlier when deciding whether the plaintiff had a property inter-
est in the terms of his employment—and ruled that due process protec-
tion is required when a state creates such an interest. 89 Scholars have
noted that Wolff represented the first time the Court recognized that.
inmates had procedural rights within a prison and that prison officials
could not punish prisoners for infractions of rules without some ele-
ments of an evidentiary hearing." Wolff's state-created liberty interest.
doctrine both allowed prisoners to challenge the discretionary manner
in which prison administrators implemented a variety of decisions and
narrowed the ability of officials to issue capricious judgments that could
have significant effects on the lives of prisoners. 91
Scholars also observed, however, that Wolff s positivist analysis
limited its otherwise broad holding. 92 Wolff held that prisoners de-
served clue process protection in situations where the state had cre-
at See id. at 557-58; see also supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.
Woff, 418 U.S. at 557.
86 See id.
87 Id .
ea Sec id. at 558.
% Sec id. at 557-58; see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78.
99 See Belbot, supra note 40, at 1-2, GO; see also Herman, supra note 28, at 1244.
91 SeeBelbot, supra note 40, at 10; Herman, supra note 28, at 1244.
92 SCC Herman, supra note 28, at 1254-55; sec also Baum, supra note 40, at 67.
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ated a specific entitlement through its statutes and regulations.93 This
reasoning both assisted and hurt prisoners' access to due process." If
prisoners could assert violations of a specific statute or regulation by
prison officials, they would not he at the mercy of arbitrary deprivations
of their freedoms, regardless of how large or small the freedom being
violated.° In contrast, if a specific right had not been created and out-
lined by the state, courts would rarely find a right to due process, regard-
less of how severe the punishment or unfair the treatment inflicted. 98
This paradox for prisoners was exemplified best in Meachum
Fano, a 1976 U.S. Supreme Court case that demonstrated the limits of
the protection Wolff rendered to prisoners. 97 In Meachum, the Court
held that prison officials had the absolute authority to make decisions
concerning where to house validly convicted prisoners and when to
transfer prisoners from prison to prison, as long as objective law did
not grant prisoners rights limiting such official discretion. 98 The
Meacham Court reasoned that the relevant liberty interest in Wolff
arose from a state law, thus ensuring clue process to protect against
the arbitrary withdrawal of such a right. 99 In Meachum, however, the
Court noted that the state had not created a specific right for prison-
95 418 U.S, at 557-58.
94 Sec Herman, supra note 28, at 1254-55.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 1255. This is also true because the controlling factor in cases where prison-
ers claimed violations of their liberty interests was almost always whether a state-created
liberty interest existed. Only three prisoner cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court be-
tween Monisscy in 1972 and Sandin v. Conner in 1995 found that a prisoner's liberty interest
arose from the Due Process Clause of the Constitution itself. See Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (holding that the Due Process Clause entitles a prisoner to proce-
dural protection before being treated with anti-psychotic medication against his will);
Vitek V. Jones, 445 U.S. 480. 487-88 (1980) (holding that the Due Process Clause guaran-
tees a prisoner procedural protection before transfer to a psychiatric hospital); Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (applying reasoning of Morrissey to the revocation of a
prisoner's probation status). Post-Sandia, the Court has found only once a prisoner stating
a claim asserting a liberty interest arising out of the Due Process Clause. See Young v.
Harper, 520 U.S. 143. 143-45 (1997) (extending the reasoning of Morrissey to the revoca-
tion of a prisoner's participation in a preparoie conditional supervision program). Thus,
Washington and Viteh are notable for being the only non-probation/parole prisoner cases in
which the Court has found the liberties of prisoners arising specifically from the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Sec Belbot, supra note 40, at 31, 36-37. One commentator has suggested that
the Court in Washington and Vitek, in pulling back from its stance that prisoners have no
liberty interests arising front the Constitution itself, may have been influenced by earlier
Court decisions acknowledging the rights of non-prisoners to refuse both forced medical
treatment and placement in mental institutions. Sec id. at 37.
97 See Meachunt, 427 U.S. 215, 226-27 (1976).
98 Sec id. at 224-27.
99 See id. at 226-27.
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ers to be free from transfers.'°° Because of this fact, prison officials
had the power to transfer prisoners for any purpose without providing
the opportunity fora hearing or any other element of due process.'°'
Meachum made clear that, unless a deprivation of liberty within prison
could be tied to the Constitution itself, only the loss of a specific state-
created liberty interest would entitle a prisoner to protection under
the Due Process Clause." 2
For the twenty years following the Wolff decision, the federal judi-
ciary decided prisoner liberty interest claims not by looking at the na-
ture of the deprivation inflicted on the prisoner itself, but by consid-
ering whether such an interest had arisen out of statutory language.'"
Some commentators have argued that the primary result of Wolff was
a burdensome rise in prisoner litigation, pointing to statistics indicat-
ing that since the mid-1970s the number of annual complaints in
which prisoners alleged that the government had deprived them of a
protected liberty interest without due process increased dramati-
cally. 104 By the 1990s, with prisoners asserting protected "liberty" in-
terests in virtually anything governed by prison rules, from sentences
to segregatory confinement,'" to the form in which one receives
ma Id.
1 " See id. at 228.
102 See 427 U.S. at 228-29.
1°3 Sec, e.g., Ky. Dep't of Corr. Y. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461, 463-65 (1989) (holding
that a close examination of the language of the relevant statutes and regulations did not
reveal the existence of a prisoner liberty interest in receiving certain visitors); Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-72 (1983) (stating that prisoner possessed liberty interest in
remaining out of administrative custody based MI "mandatory character" of the language
of the relevant state. statutes).
"4 Pierce, supra note 50, at 1979. In 1972, state prisoners filed 3348 civil rights petitions
in federal courts. Fred Cheesman et al., Prisoner Litigation in Relation to Prisoner Population,
CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS (Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.), Sept. 1998, at 4,
available at http://ww.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/Highlights/PrisonerV4No2.pdf. By
1980, this number had risen to 12,395 civil rights petitions filed, and from 1980 to 1995 this
number tripled, with more than 40,569 petitions filed in 1995. JouN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, PRISONER PrITITONS FILED IN U.S. thsTiticr COURTS, 2000, wrist TRENDS
1980-2000 3 (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/hjs/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf. This
increase in civil rights lawsuits, although impossible without U.S. Supreme Court decisions
stich as Wolff; primarily was due to a corresponding increase in the national prison popula-
tion. Sec id. (noting that "[bJetween 1980 and 1995, the rate at which State inmates filed civil
rights petitions was stable, averaging 40 petitions per 1,000 inmates").
1 °5 See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 470-71; Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 655-56 (2d Cir, 1994)
(holding prisoner possessed liberty interest in calling a witness during a disciplinary hearing).
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prison rneals, 108 prisoner civil rights cases, by some estimates, were
taking up ten percent of the federal court caseload. 1 D7
II. SANDIN V. CONNER
The language-centered approach came to a halt in 1995 with the
U.S. Supreme Court's landmark Sandin v. Conner decision, which es-
sentially ended the twenty-year application of the state-created liberty
interest doctrine. 108 Iu Sandin, a Hawaii state prisoner, DeMont Con-
ner, was placed in disciplinary segregation after being charged with
"high misconduct" for using physical interference against a prison
guard who was attempting a strip search. 109 At Conner's in jail hearing,
he was denied the opportunity to call several witnesses on his behalf
and was sentenced to thirty days in a Special Holding Unit ("SHU"). 1 "
As a result of his sentence, Conner spent thirty days in solitary
confinement, from which he was allowed out for fifty minutes each day
so he could briefly exercise and shower.'" Conner subsequently
brought a suit asserting that the denial of his ability to call witnesses on
his behalf violated his rights under the Due Process Clause. 112
After the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
granted summary judgment for the prison officials, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the ap-
plicable Hawaii state regulationsu 3 gave Conner a liberty interest in
106
 Sec Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1990) (overruling district court de-
cision finding prisoner had liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in avoid-
ing being served "sacked" lunches).
1°7 ROGER A. HANSON HENRY W.K. DALEY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CHAL-
LENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS AND JAILS 2 (1994), available at http://www.ojp.
tisdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ccopaj.pdf. Civil rights cases brought by prisoners were part of a
larger problem involving prisoner litigation—one 1998 report found that one-fifth of all
civil cases filed in federal court were brought by prison inmates. Fred Cheesman, II et al, A
Tale of Two Laws: The U.S. Congress Confronts Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 1983 Lawsuits,
22 LAW POLICY 89, 89 (2000).
los See 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); Belbot, supra note 40, at 49.
109 Id. at 475 (quoting Haw. Admin. Rule § 17-201-7 (1983)).
'I° hi. at 475-76. SHUs are separate housing areas within prisons which are designed
to hold temporarily inmates who have been separated from the general prison population
for either non-punitive or punitive purposes. See RICHARD P. SEITER, CORRECTIONAL AD-
MINISTRATION: INTEGRATING THEORY AND PRACTICE 242 (2002).
"' Sandia, 515 U.S. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Conner remained separated from
other inmates and was placed in chains during these brief periods outside the SHU, Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 476.
113 See Haw. Admin. Rule § 17-201-18(b) (2) (providing that prison officials must be
presented with "substantial evidence" before a finding of guilt).
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remaining in the general population. 114
 Applying the state-created lib-
erty interest doctrine, the Ninth Circuit read the relevant statutory lan-
guage and noted that the rules "provide[d] explicit standards that fet-
ter[ed] official discretion," concluding that because such language
existed, Conner indeed had a liberty interest worthy of clue process pro-
tection. 115 Having found a liberty interest, the court next reasoned that
because prison officials had allegedly denied Conner the right. to call
witnesses in his defense without establishing a legitimate justification for
this denial, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
officials had violated Conner's due process rights." 6 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the District Court and remanded for further findings.'"
The U.S. Supreme Court took the case on appeal and dramatically
altered hOw future courts would determine whether a prisoner had as-
serted a liberty interest deserving of due process protection." 8
 In doing
so, the Court narrowed the definition of what it means to possess a lib-
erty interest within prison walls. 119 This narrowing resulted in increased
difficulty for future prisoners to assert violations of their liberty inter-
ests and survive the summary judgment stage of litigation. 120
11.1 See Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1465-66 (9th Ci•. 1993), rev?! sub nom Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
115 See id. at 1466.
115 Sec id. at 1467-68.
" 7 Id. at 1471.
118 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84; Michelle C. Ciszak, Sandin v. Conner: Locking Out
Prisoners' Due Process Claims, 45 CA'Ell. U. L. REV. 1101, 1106-07 (1996).
119 See Pierce, supra note 50, at 1989,
120 See infra notes 150-233 and accompanying text. Sandin should also be seen as a
product of its time, as less titan one year after its issuance, Congress enacted the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA"), which imposed unique filing fees on prisoner liti-
gants, required prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and lim-
ited prisoners' ability to collect damages and attorney's fees. See Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321. 1321-1377 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.). Such provisions arose out of concern over the sheer volume of prisoner litigation
in the federal court system, much of which was perceived to be frivolous. See Brian J.
Ostrom et al., Congress. Courts. and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. 78 NoTRE DAmr. L. REV. 1525, 1525-28 (2003); supra notes 103-107 and ac-
companying text. One commentator suggests that, although concerns over the volume of
prisoner litigation were legitimate. the perception that many of these claims were frivolous
was unfounded. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. Rev. 1555, 1570-75
(2003) (analyzing data and concluding that the belief that the average inmate complaint
was illegitimate was simply Incorrect"), Nevertheless, the PLRA severely limited the ability
of prisoners to reacts federal court, with one recent study concluding that the PLRA
caused prisoner claims to drop forty-three percent from 1995 through 2001, despite a
twenty-three percent increase in the nationwide prisoner population during the same pe-
riod. See id. at 1559-60.
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In Sandin, the Supreme Court abandoned the state-created liberty
interest doctrine which had focused on statutory language in its de-
termination of the existence of a liberty interest. 121 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, cited three negative effects that
had resulted from a focus on language in determining a prisoner's lib-
erty interest. 122 First, he reasoned that the state-created liberty interest
doctrine granted prisoners the power to transform minor claims into
questions of a constitutional nature.t 23 Second, he asserted that a focus
on language was an impediment for prison officials seeking to apply
reasonable rules to prison life because any such rule could establish a
liberty interest, giving rise to claims of violations without due proc-
ess. 124 Finally, he contended, the focus on language led to the federal
courts becoming unnecessarily intertwined in the daily management
of prisons, resulting in the clogged dockets of the federal judiciary. 125
Thus, the Chief Justice also cited a goal of granting officials greater
judicial deference in the running of their prisons. 126
In summing tip the Court's policy concerns with the state-created
liberty interest doctrine, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the search
for "mandatory language in prisoner regulations" had resulted in
courts "stray[ing] from the real concerns undergirding the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause." 127 In response, the Court issued a
ruling that attempted to move the analysis of a prisoner's liberty inter-
est away from a focus on the codified language of a state law and to-
121 Sec 515 U.S. at 483 n,5, 483-84; Belbot, supra note 40, at 4. The Court explicitly
abandoned the analysis it stated in Hewitt v. Helms. Sandhi, 515 U.S. at 483 n.5, 483-84. In
Hewitt, the Court indicated that not in all circumstances would the presence of state-
codified procedural guidelines lead to the establishment of a liberty interest. Sec 459 U.S.
460, 469-72 (1983). Where states, however, "used language of an unmistakably mandatory
character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must' be employed," such
mandatory language would inherently lead to a protected liberty interest, regardless of the
nature of the deprivation. Sec id.
122 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-82. Chief justice Rehnquist was joined by justices Sandra
Day O'Conner, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas. Id. at 473.
123 See id. at 481-83.
124 Sec id. at 482.
123 Sec id. Chief Justice Rehnquist's language foreshadowed vocalized concern from
Congress that led to the enactment of the PLRA, which weakened the ability of prisoners
to litigate in federal court. See, e.g., 141 CC/NG. REC. S14, 418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating need for legislation to "bring relief to a civil justice
system overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits"); see also WPM note 120.
126 See Sandia, 515 U.S. at 482. ("(Fiederal courts ought to afford appropriate defer-
ence and flexibility to state [prison] officials trying to manage a volatile environment.").
127 Sec id. at 483.
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ward the nature of the deprivation the prisoner suffered." 8 In the fu-
ture, prison officials only would deprive prisoners of liberty interests
the Due Process Clause protected when prison authorities imposed an
"atypical and significant. hardship on the inmate in relation to the or-
dinary incidents of prison life:129 In Sandin, the Court held that the
plaintiffs thirty days in solitary confinement did not amount to an
atypical or significant hardship." 0
 The Court emphasized that
"[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of miscon-
duct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a
court of law."" 1 Thus, the Court. reversed the Ninth Circuit, thereby
ending the federal judiciary's application of the state-created liberty
interest doctrine to prisoner due process claims. 132
Unfortunately, in doing so the Court provided little explicit.
guidance for determining when an "atypical and significant" depri-
vation has occurred."3 In creating the atypical standard, the Court
did make three significant. findings, however, shedding some light
on its reasoning. 154 Principally, the Court. found that the duration
and conditions of the plaintiff's disciplinary confinement largely
"mirrored" the duration of confinement and the conditions imposed
upon other inmates in administrative confinement 135 and protective
128 See id. at 480-84.
129 See id. at 483-84. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that this standard would apply in situa-
tions in which the restraints from freedom are not so harmful as to give rise to the Due Proc-
ess Clause on their own. Id. at 484. As noted, however, situations in which the Supreme Court
has found prisoner liberty interests directly arising from the Due Process Clause are rare. See
supra note 96.
15° See 515 U.S. at 487.
Id. at 485.
132 See id. at 483-84, 488; Belbot, supra note 40, at 4.
133 See Herman, supra note 28, at 1257-58; see also Ciszak, supra note 118. at 1143-44;
Julia M. Glencer, Comment. An Atypical and Significant' Barrier to Prisoners' Procedural Due
Process Claims Based on State-Created Liberty Interests, 100 DtcK. L. Rix. 861,914 (1996).
' 54 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87.
135
 "Administrative" or "non-disciplinary" segregation is a prison management terns
that refers to non-punitive segregation imposed on a prisoner typically due to the pris-
oner's inability or perceived inability to exist in general population in a nonviolent man-
ner. See Belbot, supra note 40, at 40-41. 1t is thought that a prisoner placed in administra-
tive segregation, although not having committed a disciplinary infraction per se. can be
better supervised for the safety of other prisoners and staff. See id. The overall duration of
a stay in administrative segregation will depend on the decisions of prison officials, osten-
sibly when the prisoner is no longer considered a threat. See id. Conditions in administra-
tive segregation vary, but oftentimes are as harsh as the conditions in disciplinary
confinement, where prisoners who have violated specific prison rules are sent. See. e.g„
Haw. Admin. Rule §§ 17-201-19(c), -22 (1983) (same SHU used for inmates sentenced to
disciplinary confinement and administrative segregation); CutmthrAt. Jus .rtcr lusTrrtyrr.,
THE 2001 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK 39 (2002) [hereinafter CoatacrioNs YEARItuoic] (tie-
440	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:423
custodylm within the same prison. 157 Second, the Court noted that
general population prisoners in the plaintiffs prison also experienced
significant amounts of segregated confinement. 138 Filially, the Court
found that the plaintiff's confinement would not "inevitably affect" the
length of his larger sentence in the state prison.' 39
Beyond these observations, however, the majority provided little
direction on how future analyses should proceed." ) Numerous ques-
tions remained over how lower courts were to perform similar future
procedural due process analyses." ) As Justices Stephen Breyer and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in dissent, the "generality" of the standard
as espoused by the majority "threaten [ed] the law with uncertain ty"I42
and left "consumers of the Court's work at sea, unable to fathom what
would constitute an 'atypical, significant deprivation." 143 As could be
expected, the lower federal courts initially expressed concerns with the
vagueness of the Sandin standard and the questions it raised.'"
scribing disciplinary confinement generally as "[s[imilar to Administrative Segregation
except inmates are placed for a fixed amount of time as punishment for an infraction of
the rules"). Such conditions usually consist of solitary confinement for nearly twenty-four
hours a day with none of the privileges and opportunities available to the general prison
population. Sec G. LARRY MAYS & L, THOMAS WINFREE, JR., CONTEMPORARY CORREMONS
197 (2d ed. 2002). Some critics have voiced concern over administrative segregation, not-
ing the "standardless nature" of how it is imposed and the real possibility of undefined
terms of confinement. See Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A
Psychological Analysis of Superrnax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
477, 561 & n.429 (1997).
136 'Protective custody" is a management term some prisons use that refers to non-
punitive segregation utilized for prisoners who have been threatened with or have been
the victims of physical violence, or who have reputations within the prison as informants,
subjecting them to danger. See NIAYS & Wuvritcr., supra note 135, at 197. Prisoners in pro-
tective custody are placed in maximum-security units and have their privileges revoked in a
manner similar to those prisoners in administrative segregation. See id.; see also MARY Bos-
WORTH, THE U.S, FEDERAL. PRISON SYSTEM 106-07 (2002) (describing that prisoners in
federal prison fearing their safety are placed in administrative detention as "protection
cases"). Because of the similarity in conditions of both administrative and protective segre-
gation, and the non-punitive nature of both confinements, for purposes of this Note the
term "administrative" segregation or confinement includes protective custody status.
137 Sec Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
138 Id. Prisoners in general population were held in their cells from twelve to sixteen
hours a day. Id. at 486 n.8.
136 Id. at 487.
140 See id. at 486-87.
141 See Herman, supra note 28, at 1257-58.
142 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 196 (Breye4, dissenting).
143 Id. at 19011.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
144 See, e.g., Justice v. Coughlin, 941 F. Stipp. 1312, 1317 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Sandin
significantly altered the conceptual framework to be employed when a prisoner claims that
he or she has been deprived of liberty without due process.... 11-flowever, the Sandin
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HI. LOWER COURT APPLICATION OF SAND IN V. CONNER AND
CONFINEMENT
Despite the initial expressions of confusion, the circuit courts of
appeals began to apply the "atypical and significant" standard in in-
traprison confinement cases with more predictable results." 5 The
methodologies the courts now employ, however, vary on a number of
significant points, with the respective courts drawing on the different
factors and policy justifications Chief Justice Rehnquist cited in Sandhi
v. Conner. 46 Such differences are most noticeable, and also become
most significant, when the courts attempt to characterize the baseline
to which the challenged confinement. should be compared in deter-
mining whether a prisoner has suffered an atypical and significant
hardship. 147 Any clarification of these differences will depend on fu-
ture U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 148 This Part illustrates some of the
more significant differences between the courts of appeals in carrying
out their analyses of a prisoner's liberty interest under the standard
set forth in Sandin. 149
This Part first discusses the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth,
and Tenth Circuits' approach, which uses the conditions in a prison's
administrative confinement as the principal comparative baseline in
the liberty interest. analysis, a method that usually results in no liberty
interest being found for the prisoner.'" This Part next looks at the
unique methodologies the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits have developed."' The Fifth Circuit does not engage in a dis-
cussion of comparative baselines, and instead focuses solely on whether
an intraprison confinement results in an extended prison sentence. 152
The Seventh Circuit utilizes as its comparative baseline the harshest
confinement conditions of any state prison within a particular state. 153
Such analyses will almost never find that a prisoner possesses a liberty
decision does not completely clarify the parameters of prison/due process analysis.");
Knox v. Lanham. 895 F. Stipp. 750,759 (0, Md. 1995) ("Unfortunately, the application of
this new standard ... is far from clean"), offd, 76 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 1996).
149 See infra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
146 See sup? notes 122-139 and accompanying text; infra notes 150-233 and accompa-
nying text.
147 See infra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
199 See infra notes 161-188 and accompanying text.
151 See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
192 See infra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
159 Sec infra notes 192-202 and accompanying text.
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interest in a certain level of confinement.'" Finally, this Part discusses
the relatively more lenient approaches found in the Courts of Appeals
for the D.C. and Second Circuits, with the D.C. Circuit using "routine"
administrative confinement as its baseline, and the Second Circuit con-
sidering conditions in both administrative confinement and general
population in its analysis. 155 It is in these circuit courts that prisoners
have their best chance of making a showing that they possessed a liberty
interest in remaining in a prison's general population. 156
Before beginning this discussion, it is important to note why this
Part does not address all circuit courts and the district courts under
their jurisdiction on an in-depth level.'" This is because a sizable num-
ber of courts, in a manner similar to the Fifth Circuit, do not engage in
a discussion of comparative baselines when applying Sandin in the con-
text of intraprison confinement. 158 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, however,
these courts generally have less to say in their application of Sandhi,
with decisions that read the case as inevitably leading to the conclusion
that intraprison confinements cannot raise liberty interests. 159 Although
these courts generally issue decisions with results similar to those of the
Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit Courts, it is ultimately their
154 See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
155 See infra notes 203-233 and accompanying text.
156 See infra notes 203-233 and accompanying text.
07 See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
158 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
159 See. e.g., Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3cl 1063, 1064-66 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming lower
court dismissal of a liberty interest claim arising out of a thirty-day sentence to punitive
segregation, stating, "[Nv]e have consistently held that administrative and disciplinary seg-
regation are not atypical and significant hardships tinder Sandin."); Henderson v. Hamren,
No. 01-15094, 2002 WL 554457, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2002) ("[F]reedom from administra-
tive segregation does not give rise to a protected liberty interest"); L'Heureux v. Ashton,
No. 98-1336, 1998 W. 1085692, at *1 (1st Cir. Oct. 13, 1998) (per curiam) (affirming
lower court grant of summary judgment against prisoner due process claim arising out of
sentence to disciplinary confinement, citing Sandin, yet engaging in no discussion of the
conditions or duration of confinement); Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th
Cir. 1998) (stating merely. "[plaintiff] has not shown that he was deprived of a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest as defined in Sandia," in discussing the merits of a pris-
oner claim arising out of placement in administrative confinement for two months); May v.
Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that freedom from administrative seg-
regation does not give rise to a protected liberty interest because it is within the terms of a
prisoner's confinement and therefore cannot be considered atypical under Sandia); Hewes
v. R.I. Dep't of Corr., No. C.A.00-205 S, 2003 WL 751027, at *2 (D.R.1. Feb. 11, 2003)
("[P]laintiff complains of being subject to thirty clays punitive segregation for his first of-
fense and ten days for each of the last two offenses. No liberty interest is implicated
here."); Alley v. Angelone, 962 F. Stipp. 827, 833 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("[A]n inmate who is
incarcerated subject to a lawful conviction has no liberty interest in being free from
placement in segregation.").
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minimal discussion as to why Sandhi should lead to such results that
makes it possible to address the analyses of these courts in a more cur-
sory fashion. 16°
A. The Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits: Administrative
Confinement as the Baseline
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has in-
terpreted Sandia as holding that the analysis surrounding the existence
of a prisoner's liberty interest invites a comparison between the condi-
tions of the plaintiff's challenged confinement with the conditions of
non-disciplinary confinement in the same prison, such as administra-
tive segregation.'°' If the differences between such confinements reveal
atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prisoner life, then a liberty interest will exist. 162 Such a reading fo-
cuses on language from Sandin stating that the conditions imposed on
the plaintiff in that, case did not present. a "dramatic departure" from
his prison experience because the conditions did not vary greatly from
those found in non-disciplinary confinement in the same prison. 163
Such an interpretation is problematic for prisoners because it draws to
the forefront language from Sandia, which seems to imply that adminis-
trative segregation is a normal part of prison life that. rarely, if ever, will
raise a liberty interest.'"
In 1997, in Griffin v. 'Vaughn, the Third Circuit made a ruling us-
ing such reasoning. 165 In that case, the prison officials had placed the
plaintiff in administrative confinement for fifteen months, without a
hearing, due to suspicion of his involvement in the rape of a female
prison guard. 166 The conditions of the assignment consisted of segre-
gation with the exception of one hour a day allowed outside the cell
for exercise and enough additional time for three showers a week. 07
The plaintiff sued, asserting the existence of a liberty interest in re-
180 See supin note 159 and accompanying text.
161 Sec Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140,143-44 (3d Cir. 2000); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d
703,706 (3d Cir. 1997),
162 Sec Shoats, 213 F.3d at 143-44; Griffin. 112 F.3d at 706.
163 See 515 U.S. 472.485-86 (1995).
161 See id.
165 SeclI2 F.3d at 706-08.
10 /d. at 705,
187 Id. at 707. Additionally, prisoners in administrative confinement were not allowed
television, radios, or phone calls, and were limited to one non-legal visitor a week. Id. at
706-07.
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maining out of administrative confinement. 168 The court evaluated
the conditions of the prisoner's confinement and noted that a wide
range of prisoners from general population, under the relevant prison
regulations, could be transferred to administrative confinement for a
number of non-punitive reasons. 165 The court tints concluded that
administrative segregation was an ordinary incident of prison life, be-
cause sentenced inmates in the plaintiff's prison may reasonably ex-
pect to encounter such confinement as a result of their convictions.'"
The court also stated that the total time faced in confinement
could play a factor in a finding of atypicality, but not in the present
situation."' The Griffin  court made the logical jump that because a
variety of prisoners may end up in administrative segregation for a
variety of reasons, a stay in administrative segregation for months at a
time was "not uncommon."'" Thus, the plaintiff's stay in non-
disciplinary confinement for fifteen months fell "within the expected
parameters of the sentence imposed ... by a court of law" and the
plaintiff, because of the non-existence of a liberty interest, was not
privy to the protections of procedural due process.'"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has also
interpreted post-Sandin liberty interest claims in a manner that effec-
tively bars claims arising out of confinement in administrative segre-
gation."' The earlier post-Sandin decisions from the Circuit do not
reveal much analysis, simply citing the policy of deference to prison
officials discussed in the Sandin decision. 175 In 1998, in Jones v. Baker;
the Sixth Circuit seemed to step back from that position by pointing
out that not every claim arising out of confinement in administrative
1611 Id. at 705.
169 See Gnffin, 112 F.3d at 707-08.
17° See hi.
171 See id. at 708-09. More recently, in 2000, the Third Circuit ruled in Shoats v. Horn
that a prisoner held for eight years in administrative confinement experienced conditions
that were atypical enough to create a liberty interest. See 213 F.3d at 144.
172 See 112 F.3d at 708. The court made this "conclu[sion] with confidence," not citing
anything objective as to whether placement in administrative confinement was a common
prisoner experience in that particular prison. See id.
173 See id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485).
174 See, e.g., Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that inmate
who was recommended for release from administrative confinement yet remained in seg-
regation for 117 days due to lack of space in general population did not stiffer an "atypical
and significant hardship"); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cu'. 1995)
(holding placement in administrative detention does not give rise to a liberty interest such
that procedural protections of notice and a hearing are necessary prior to placement).
175 See Mackey, 111 F.3d at 463; Rimmer-Bry, 62 F.3d at 790-91.
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segregation should automatically fail to raise a liberty interest. 176
 The
result in Jones, however, was similar to the Circuit's earlier decisions:
an inmate who was placed in administrative segregation for two-and-a-
half years, during which time he was tinder investigation for a prison-
riot murder of a prison guard, did not possess a liberty interest. in re-
maining in general population.'"
The Jones court, although taking into consideration the long du-
ration of confinement, highlighted the language from Sandi?, which
indicated that a factor to be considered in making a liberty interest
determination is whether the confinement would necessarily affect
the duration of the prisoner's sentence.rs The court concluded that
in the present case there was no evidence that the segregation would
do so.'" The court also took into account. that the prison had a le-
gitimate reason for placing the inmate in confinement's° Finally, the
court considered that the conditions of segregation were no different
than conditions the prison's other inmates held in administrative seg-
regation faced: 1s' Consistent with the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
thus indicated that administrative confinement. will rarely lead to a
liberty interest. 182
Finally, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and district courts
within its jurisdiction have also interpreted Sandhi as indicating that
courts should look to the conditions of administrative segregation as
the proper comparative baseline in a prisoner liberty interest analy-
sis. 183 Thus, in 2000, the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas in Johnson v, Bureau of Prism's held that a one-year placement in
administrative confinement could not lead to the creation of a liberty
178 See 155 F.3d 810,813 (6th Cir. 1998).
177 See id. at 811-13.
178 See id. at 812.
' 79 Id.
180 Id. at 812-13.
"'Vona, 155 F.3d at 813.
182 See id. at 812-13. The concurring judge in Jones agreed with the majority view that it
is reasonable to assign an inmate to administrative segregation following a prison riot, yet
commented that "such confinement for a period of over two and a half years is clearly a
rare occurrence." See id. at 815 (Gilman. J.. concurring). Moreover. the concurring judge
argued that the majority decision wrongly assumed that a sentence to administrative segre-
gation is an event typical of prison life. See id. at 815-16 (Gilman. J., concurring). Instead,
the judge maintained that Sandhi called for a snore nuanced, fact-specific inquiry into the
particular nature of the conditions the individual plaintiff faced, which the majority failed
to do. Sec id. (Gilman, J., concurring). This is more consistent with the approach the Sec-
ond Circuit applies. Sec infra notes 214-233 and accompanying text.
183 See Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222,1225-26 (10th Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Bureau
of Prisons, No. 99-3239-1(HV, 2000	 574881, at *4 (0. Kan. Apr. 4.2000).
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interest, given that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the du-
ration or conditions of his confinement were abnormal compared to
normal placements in administrative confinement.' 84 The court relied
on the same logic the Third Circuit employed in Griffin, crediting the
fact that inmates can be placed in administrative segregation for a va-
riety of reasons. 185
An interesting contrast to Johnson, however, can be seen in the
Tenth Circuit's recent 2002 decision in Gaines v. Stenseng, in which the
court reversed and remanded a district court decision dismissing a
prisoner's assertion of a liberty interest in avoiding a seventy-five-day
sentence to disciplinary segregation. 1136 The Gaines court stated that
the lower court erred by assuming, with little analysis, that seventy-five
days in disciplinary confinement was an event typical of prison life. 187
On remand, the circuit court not only instructed the district court to
engage in an examination of the typical conditions of confinement in
the plaintiffs prison, but also indicated that the responsibility for
gathering such information should be shared by the state.lM
B. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits: No Baseline and Extreme
Confinement as the Baseline
VIThereas the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have used conditions
of administrative segregation as the standard for deciding atypicality,
thereby issuing rulings indicating that administrative confinement
rarely could implicate a liberty interest, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, at least semantically, has been the toughest
on prisoners, stating that disciplinary segregation will never implicate a
liberty interest unless it "inevitably" lengthens a prisoner's sentence."39
184 See 2000 Wt. 574881. at *4.
1126 See Griffin. 112 F.3d at 708; Johnson, 2000 WL 574881, at *4.
"36 292 F.3d at 12 96.
187 See id. at 1225-26.
1813 See id.
lag Sec Carson v. Johnson. 112 F.3d 818.821 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandia, 515 U.S.
at 487); see also supra notes 161-188 and accompanying text. There are several problems
inherent with Chief Justice Rehnquist's observation that Conner's thirty-day sentence to
disciplinary confinement would not affect the overall duration of his sentence. See Belbot,
SUP] note 40, at 57-58; infra notes 190-191 and accompanying text. First, Professor Bar-
bara Belbot offers several reasons why placement in administrative and disciplinary
confinement certainly could affect a prisoner's sentence, most importantly because parole
boards often review such confinements in their decision-making process. Sec Belbot, supra
note 40, at 57-58. Second, from an evidentiary perspective, it will be almost impossible for
any prisoner to definitively demonstrate to a court bow confinement affected a prison
sentence, given that paroling authorities can consider sentences to disciplinary
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In addition, the Fifth Circuit has drawn from Saudin the conclusion
that administrative segregation, being an incident of prison life, can-
not raise a liberty interest the Fourteenth Amendment protects. 19°
Thus, the Fifth Circuit. has not engaged in a dialogue of "comparative
baselines" and has not given much weight to the duration of the seg-
regatory 5onfinement. as a factor in its analysis. 191
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also
has interpreted Sandier in a manner resulting in particularly restrictive
results for prisoners. 192 Like the above circuits, the Seventh Circuit
defines the comparative baseline as the conditions of non-disciplinary
segregation:193 Taking a different approach, however, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has ruled that. the proper inquiry must examine not simply the
conditions of confinement within the particular prison housing the
relevant prisoner, but also the confinement conditions within the en-
tire state prison system, including the harshest facility in a particular
state's most restrictive prison, 194 Thus, it appears that in the Seventh
Circuit, like in the Fifth, no assignment to administrative or discipli-
nary confinement, even if arbitrarily imposed, will ever raise a liberty
interest. ] 95
confinement in their decision making, but do not have to. Sec id. Finally, because of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's observation without much elucidation on that point, future courts will
more likely rely on the assumption that stays in administrative and disciplinary
confinement will not affect a prisoner's overall sentence. Sec infra notes 190-191 and ac-
companying text,
' 9° Sec Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (dismissing as "frivolous"
and lackting1 an arguable basis in law or fact" plaintiff's claim that he possessed a liberty
interest due to his confinement in administrative segregation); Orellaua v, Kyle, 65 F.3d 29,
31-32, 32 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that, although Sandia did not specifically overrule
Heroin v. Helms, a case which had found a liberty interest arising from confinement in ad-
ministrative segregation, it is nonetheless "unlikely" post-Saudis that administrative segre-
gation could give rise to a constitutional claim, given that Sandia found a severe sentence
to disciplinary segregation to be typical of prison and also rejected the positivist liberty
interest methodology).
191 See Pichardo, 73 F.3d at 612-13 (stating nowhere the specific duration of plaintiff's
confinement in ruling that placement in administrative confinement does not raise a lib-
erty interest); see also Brown v. Cockrell, No. 3:01-U-1090-H, 2002 1FL 638584, at *3 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 17, 2002) (holding twenty-two months in administrative confinement does not
implicate a liberty interest).




195 Sec id. at 1175-77. Judge Richard Posner in Wagner v. Hanks assumed that a liberty in-
terest protectible by the Due Process Clause could arise in an extreme and rare situation
where the challenged conditions were more severe than confinement conditions in the
state's most restrictive prison. See id. at 1176-77. Posner also wrote, however, that such a
situation would likely invoke the Eighth Amendment. Sec id. Posner's argument is interest-
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In 1997, in Wagner v. Hanksjudge Richard Posner reached such a
result by first reasoning that the primary factor that concerned the
Sandia Court was the lack of significant differences between the disci-
plinary confinement the plaintiff faced in Sandia and the non-
disciplinary conditions in that prison. 06 Judge Posner took a further
logical step by arguing that it would be "arbitrary" to conduct an
analysis that both "distinguish [es] between the different parts of the
same prison, on the one hand, and the different prisons in the same
system, on the other." 197 Moreover, Posner noted that the Supreme
Court has held that a transfer of a prisoner from one prison to an-
other does not raise a liberty interest under the Constitution, even
when the conditions of confinement are harsher at the subsequent
prison. 198 Thus, Posner concluded (hat the relevant comparison can-
not be restricted to conditions in the same prison, unless it is the most
protective prison in the state. 199
Posner acknowledged that such an interpretation is "harsh" and
that, possibly, it was not "intended" by the Supreme Court."° None-
theless, Posner argued that when the Court's transfer cases are viewed
in conjunction with Sandia, the reasonable conclusion is that a proper
examination includes an inquiry into all prison conditions within a
particular state. 201 Posner's reading of Sandin, although unique, has
not been modified or overruled by the Seventh Circuit, and has been
ing when considered in light of Professor Susan Herman's criticism that Sandin has resulted
in a situation where providing judicial relief under the Fourteenth Amendment in connec-
tion with atypical and significant deprivations of freedom may be no different than provid-
ing judicial relief for cruel and unusual punishment. See Herman, supra note 28, at 1261.
196 See 128 F.3d at 1175. In contrast to Posner's acceptance of the Supreme Court's
analysis, District Court Judge Milton Shadur's criticism of the Supreme Court's choice to
use administrative confinement as a baseline for comparing challenged confinement con-
ditions is worth noting. See Leslie v. Doyle, 896 F. Stipp. 771, 773 n.4 (N.D. III. 1995). alp,
125 F.3d 1132 (7th Cir. 1997). judge Shadur's central point is that administrative confine-
ment, far from being an ordinary incident of prison life, for most prisoners is not routine
and represents a major departure in the conditions of their confinement. Sec id.
197 Sec Wagner; 128 F.3d at 1175.
198 See rd. (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247-18 (1983); Montanye v. Hay-
mes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)).
199 See id.
20° Id. at 1176. Posner stated that the question of whether the relevant comparison
group encompasses additional prisons was not addressed in Sandin because in that case the
plaintiff was already housed in the most restrictive prison in the state. See id.
701 See id. at 1175-76. Posner noted that, although the Sandin Court "cited the transfer
cases with approval." the Court "did not draw the logical inference and may not have in-
tended to push its approach to its logical extreme." Id. at 1176. Posner further added, "we
would welcome clarification of the issue by the Court" asto whether the comparison group
includes other prisons, including those in other states. Id.
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applied on several occasions to deny prisoners due process protection
in sentences to both administrative and disciplinary confinement. 202
C. TheD.C. Circuit and Second Circuit: "Routine"Ad minisnative
Confinement and Both Administrative Confinement
and General Population as the Baseline
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
like the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, uses conditions of administra-
tive confinement as the baseline for a comparison of challenged condi-
tions of confinement. 20 It also agrees with those circuits that, post-
Sandin, administrative confinement should be viewed as an instrument
of prison . management incidental to prison life. 204 Unlike the above
circuits, however, the D.C. Circuit has not concluded that such an un-
derstanding will necessarily preclude a liberty interest claim from aris-
ing out of administrative segregation, because the relevant comparison
a court must make is to confinement that prison officials "routinely im-
pose on inmates serving similar sentences." 205 The implication is that
administrative confinement could establish impairment of a liberty in-
terest if a prisoner was confined in administrative confinement under
conditions or for a duration more adverse than those "routinely im-
posed" on inmates serving sentences of a similar length. 20°
In 1999, in Hatch v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit reversed a
decision by the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia that had found that a prisoner, under Sandin, could not assert a
liberty interest against spending seven months in administrative seg-
regation. 207 Noting that administrative segregation would usually be a
normal part of prison life, the court nonetheless indicated that Sandin
did not dictate this to be a bright-line rille. 208 Instead, the court drew
on language from Sandin that noted first that the prisoner's
2°2 See Whitford v, Boglino. No. 97-3715, 1999 WL 828598, at *2-3 (7th Cir. Oct. 13,
1999) (holding that a three-week placement in disciplinary segregation unit that was "ex-
cessively hot, dirty, and constantly , illuminated" did not give rise to a liberty interesi); Luc-
zak v. Cooper, No. 98 C 6807, 1999 91893, at 8'2-3 (N.D. III. Feb. 11, 1999) (holding
fifty-nine days in disciplinary segregation did not give rise to a liberty interest); Henard v.
Newkirk, 987 F. Stipp. 691, 693 (N.D. lid. 1997) (concluding one year in disciplinary seg-
regation did not give rise to a liberty interest).
"3 See Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
204 Sec id.
205 See id. (emphasis added).
206 Sec id.
207 See id. at 84719.
208 See Hatch, 184 F.3d at 858.
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confinement in that case was neither more restrictive nor of a greater
duration than similar confinement in the prison and second, that the
inmate's thirty-clay sentence to disciplinary segregation "was within
the range of confinement to be normally expected for one serving an
indeterminate term of 30 years to life."209 Surmising from this lan-
guage that the appropriate analysis depends on the characteristics of
the actual sentence imposed, the Hatch court concluded that atypical-
ity depends not only on the conditions of confinement, including du-
ration, but. notably, whether it is normally inflicted on other prisoners
serving sentences of similar lengths, regardless of whether the sen-
tence is deemed punitive or administrative. 210
The D.C. Circuit thus indicated that courts in the future should
undertake fact -specific inquiries into the particulars of a prisoner's
confinement. 2" The goal of such an inquiry should be to answer
whether the dissimilarities between the conditions of the confinement
and the conditions routinely imposed on prisoners in comparable
segregation, including the regular conditions of administrative segre-
gation, are significant enough to amount to atypical and significant
hardships.212 The Hatch court remanded for such an inquiry. 21 s
Although the D.C. Circuit provides more protection to prisoners
than do the previously discussed circuits, prisoners have found the
greatest post-Sandia protection in the Second Circuit and in the dis-
trict courts that follow Second Circuit precedent. 214 In that circuit, in
determining whether segregatory conditions bring about atypical and
209 Sec id. at 856 (quoting Sandia, 515 U.S. at 487).
210 See id.
211 See id. at 858.
212 See id. The court generally disagreed with the methodology the Seventh Circuit
employed, stating that the only dine the relevant inquiry would take into consideration
more restrictive conditions at other prisons would be if and when it could be shown first,
that inmates similar to the plaintiff are likely to be transferred to other prisons, and sec-
ond, that once transferred, they will encounter such restrictive conditions. See id. at 857.
213 Hatch. 184 F.3d at 858. Hatch soon was followed by a case under the jurisdiction of
the D.C. Circuit involving a prisoner alleging liberty interests arising from placement in
administrative segregation. Brown v. District of Columbia, 66 F. Stipp. 2d 41, 45-46 (D.D.C.
1999). There, the district court employed the standards discussed in Hatch. Id.
214 See Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 230-31 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that placement
in a SHU for 305 days consisting of twenty-three-hour-a-day solitary confinement was a
"sufficient departure from the ordinary incidents of prison life to require procedural due
process"); Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 394 (2d Cir. 1999) (remanding for inquiry as to
whether ninety-day sentence to segregatory confinement was an atypical and significant
deprivation); McClary v. Kelly, 4 F. Stipp. 2d 195, 210-11 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that
four-year assignment in administrative confinement was "unusual" when compared with
normal prison life).
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significant hardships, the courts have called for fact-specific examina-
tions that carefully weigh the duration of the segregation and com-
pare the challenged confinement with conditions both in administra-
tive confinement. and in the general prison population . 215
For example, in 1997, in Brooks u DiFasi, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further fact-
finding a lower court ruling dismissing a prisoner suit that had asserted
a liberty interest arising from being sentenced to disciplinary
confinement for 180 days. 21 ° The Brooks court commented that the
lower court erred in its conclusion that such a confinement could not.
impose an atypical hardship under Sandia because New York prison
regulations describing disciplinary and non-disciplinary segregation
contain only minor differences, with both allowing for long periods of
prisoner isolation.2 " Instead, the Brooks court stated that comparing
disciplinary and non-disciplinary confinement. was only part of a Sandia
examination. 218 The court noted that. the Sandia decision also called for
an inquiry into the conditions of the challenged segregation compared
with prison conditions in general population, in addition to examina-
tions of the duration of confinement and the effect such confinement
would have on a prisoner's sentence. 219 Moreover, the Brooks court.
commented that putting too much emphasis on what state regulations
proscribed to be the proper conditions for segregated living, as the
lower court had done, would rarely be useful, as the focus must not be
on hypothetical conditions, but. on the actual challenged conditions at.
hand.22° Brooks is just one example of the Second Circuit's remanding
of cases for factual findings as to the nature and duration of the chal-
lenged confinemen 021
Consistent with such an approach, the Second Circuit has rejected
any interpretation of Sandia that concludes that the Court established a
per se rule that disciplinary confinement, or even administrative
confinement, will never give rise to a liberty interest, 222 As the Second
215 See, e.g.. Arce v. Walker, 139 rid 329, 336-37 (2d Cir. 1998); Brooks v. DiFasi, 112
F.3d 46,48-49 (2d Cir. 1997)
216 112 F.3d at 47.
217 See id. at 48-49.
SIB See id. at 49.
219 Sec id. at 48-49.
22° See id. at 49.
221 See, e.g., Welch, 196 F.3d at 394-95; Brooks, 112 F.3d at 49; Miller r. Selsky, 111 F.3d 7,
8-9 (2d Cir. 1997) (remanding for examination as to whether 125-day disciplinary con-
finement was an atypical and significant hardship).
222 See Sealey Gilmer, 197 F.3d 578, 584-85 (2r1 Cir. 1999); Miller, Ill F.3d at 9.
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Circuit indicated in 1999 in Scatty v. Gillum; all confinements require
the necessary factual analysis into atypicality. 228 The Seale), court added
that if Sandhi_ had meant to foreclose protected liberty interests from
arising out of all administrative confinements, "we would expect to see
more pointed language to that effect." 224 Such language contradicts the
positions the majority of other federal courts have taken. 228
The Second Circuit's most recent cases have looked closely at the
duration of confinement and, given the facts, have not hesitated to find
atypicality. 228 Although the Circuit has not established a bright-line rule
as to how many days will necessitate such a finding, 227 the Circuit is by
far the most liberal in its treatment of prisoners: confinements of 180
and 305 days have been found to create liberty interests under Sandin,
and a confinement of only 90 clays was remanded for further
factfinding. 228 The longest confinement not to have been found to cre-
ate a liberty interest is 101 days, 229 although a later Second Circuit deci-
sion emphasized that even that length might qualify as atypical. 23°
Although duration has been a significant factor in the Second
Circuit's analysis, the court repeatedly acknowledges that the proper
inquiry requires an examination into both the duration and the con-
ditions of confinement. 231 Recent case law indicates that a plaintiff in
the Second Circuit will likely survive a motion to dismiss if there is
evidence of segregation for a duration that a judge considers unrea-
223 See 197 F.3d at 585-86.
224 Id. at 585 .
225 See sum notes 161-202 and accompanying text.
226 See infra notes 227-233 and accompanying text.
227 See Colon, 215 F.3d at 232-34; id. at 235-37 (Walker, J., concurring). In Colon, Judge
Jon Newman, writing for the majority, and Judge John Walker, writing in concurrence,
disagreed over whether the Circuit should adopt a "bright-line rule" as to •how long a
confinement must be before a liberty interest is created, with Judge Newman proposing
180 days and Judge Walker rejecting such an approach and instead advocating a case by
case factual approach. See id. at 232-34; id. at 235-37 (Walker, J., concurring). The Circuit
has not adopted Judge Newman's per se rule, but case law from the Circuit has indicated
that confinements over 100 days are almost always presumptively atypical. Sec infra notes
228-233 and accompanying text.
223 See Colon, 215 F.3d at 230-31 (305 days); Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103,105-06,
108 (2d Ci•. 1999) (180 days); 	 196 F.3d at 394 (90 days).
229 See Seelig, 197 F.3d at 589-90.
236 Sec Colon. 215 F.3d at 232 n.5 (suggesting confinement of less than 101 days could
be found to qualify as "atypical and severe" under a more fully developed record). The
Colon court furthermore explicitly instructed district courts to develop detailed factual re-
cords in cases asserting confinements of between 101 and 305 days. See id. at 232.
231 See Sealey, 197 F.3d at 586 ("[EJspecially harsh conditions endured for a brief inter-
val and somewhat harsh conditions endured for a prolonged interval might both he atypi-
cal."); Welch, 196 F.3d at 393.
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sonable 252
	the eventual outcome will depend on the
particular characteristics of the segregation at issue, in which duration
of confinement will make up only part of the analysis. 233
IV. THE ILLOGICAL RESULTS AND HARMFUL EFFECTS OF SANDIN V.
CONNER'S APPLICATION IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Prior to the development of significant post-Sandin case law, the
Sandin v. Coulter decision was criticized on a number of levels. 234 To
some, the case represented a sacrifice of prisoners' rights in the name
of judicial efficiency. 235 Others asserted that Sandin inevitably invited
situations whereby prison officials could segregate inmates for no le-
gitimate reason whatsoever, perhaps for malicious reasons or because
of an official's personal biases.23° It would be difficult for federal
courts to consider meaningfully such claims, even when state statutes
existed that explicitly prohibited such segregation. 237
 One critic
voiced concerns that. Sandin would force federal courts to view any
prisoner-filed due process claim as presumptively suspect.m
Others noted that Sandhi represented in many ways the return of
the "hands-off" doctrine to the federal judiciary because state law could
no longer give rise to constitutional safeguards, regardless of how arbi-
trarily it was applied, unless it imposed an atypical and significant hard-
ship on an inmate. 23° As a result, Sandin effectively weakened the liberty
232 Sec,	 Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2000) (denying prison official's
motion to dismiss prisoner's complaint alleging confinement of 514 days).
See id.
234 See generally Belbot, supra note 40, at 4-6, 67-69; Herman, supra note 28, at 1252,
1257-58.
235 See Herman, supra note 28, at 1252.
238 See Leslie v. Doyle. 896 F. Stipp. 771. 773-74 (N.D. 111. 1995). Specifically, Judge
Shadur noted that;
IT1he consequence of taking Sandin at its word ... is to arm prison authori-
ties, who have heretofore possessed uncircumscribed powers over the inmates
within their custody only to a limited extent, with now-unrestrained power to
punish those inmates by arbitrary reassignment to the meaningfully more re-
strictive environment of segregated confinement. And it appears that can be
done by a correctional official for no reason at all—even out of sheer vindic-
tiveness—because the absence of due process means nothing in terms of a
Section 1983 claim unless the inmate's liberty interest has been infringed.
Id.
237 See Herman. sn/na note 28, at 1252.
238 See id.
239 Seel3elbot, supra note 40. at 4-6; see also Philip W. Sbaratta. Note, Sand in V. Conner:
The Supreme Court's Narrowing of Pdsonms' One Process and Nye Missed Opportunity to Discover
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interest doctrine by ensuring that most codified rights relating to pris-
oners would never be enforced through the application of viable pro-
cedural mandates. 2" Instead, Sandi,' transformed such mandates into
mere "guidelines for official conduct," which prison officials could
choose to ignore with little consequence."' Because the U.S. Supreme
Court abandoned the state-created liberty interest doctrine and refo-
cused the analysis on the nature of the harm suffered, one critic ac-
cused it of basing its definition of what represents a sufficient harm to
implement due process on "at best ... an uninformed and naive un-
derstanding of prison life, or, at worst ... a mean-spirited attitude that
panders to society's less noble instincts." 242 The overriding concern ex-
pressed was that such an understanding, as expressed in Sandhi, would
end the judiciary's ability to hear even meritorious Fourteenth
Amendment inmate claims. 2-13
Such concerns have largely become a reality. 244 In Sandin, Chief
Justice Rehnquist issued a call for greater judicial efficiency in the
realm of federal prisoner litigation. 245 In the years since, this call has
been answered: with the exception of cases brought in the Second
Circuit, it is rare to find a case asserting a liberty interest in avoiding
intraprison confinement that survived summary judgment. 2" In addi-
tion, these cases reveal findings of fact supporting the critics' predic-
tion that Sandin would lead to situations in which prison officials
could send prisoners to confinement for no justifiable reason without
any judicial oversight.247
True Liberty, 81 Cottrau. L. REV. 744, 787 (1996) ("Sandin v. Canner has brought prison
context procedural due process back full circle to its pre-Goldberg era position.").
240 See Belbot, supra note 40, at 6.
241 id.
242 Id. at 69.
245 See id. at 68.
244 See supra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
245 Sec 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995).
246 See supra notes 150-233 and accompanying text. Although stating a claim as a pris-
oner is easiest, relatively, in the Second Circuit, successfully doing so is still clearly a
difficult task. See Jonathan D. Rosenbloom. Exploring Methods to Improve Management and
Fairness in Pro Se Cases: .4 Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York. 30
FORMIAM URB. L.J. 305. 343-44 (2003) (analyzing a sample group of pro se civil rights
litigation filed in the Southern District of New York between 1995 and 1999 and stating
that Sandin was one of the most frequently cited cases leading to a dismissal for failure to
state a claim); see also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
247 Sec Rodgers v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming sum-
mary judgment dismissal of prisoner claim asserting a liberty interest arising out of a two-
month placement in administrative segregation, with plaintiff alleging placement resulted
from his request for a sanitary dining table); Wilson V. Harper, 949 F. Stipp. 714, 715, 720,
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It is noteworthy and perhaps a little ironic that such consistently
harsh results arose out of a decision that failed to direct how courts
should analyze prisoner liberty interest claims. 248 Because of this con-
fusion, it appears that most courts have relied in their decision mak-
ing on the principle of deference to prison officials discussed in
Sandhi, essentially giving the benefit of the doubt to such officials. 249
Thus, in most courts across the country, placement in administrative
and disciplinary confinement, regardless of the reason, cannot raise a
liberty interest for a prisoner. 2"
It is unclear whether this result. was the Sandhi Court's inten-
tion. 2" One indication that this in fact was the intended result was that
Chief justice Rehnquist used administrative confinement as the prin-
cipal comparative baseline in the Court's examination of the plaintiffs
confinement. 252 Such a comparison implies that sentences to solitary
confinement for twenty-three hours a day for indefinite time periods
will always be "typical" incidents not resulting in "significant" depriva-
tions for the prisoner. 2" The Court's discussion of the factors sur-
rounding the plaintiff's particular confinement, including a compari-
son to the conditions in general population, however, indicates a
rejection of any per se rules. 254 It is the lack of description as to how
the factors should interplay in future decisions, or even if such factors
should be considered in future situations at all, that has caused the
lower courts to develop such differing methodologies, the majority of
which result in finding no liberty interest for the plainiiff. 255
Only the D.C. Circuit. and the Second Circuit have developed
consistent case law out of the Sandia decision that performs a more
in-depth factual analysis of the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff's
confinement. 256 Drawing on language that discussed the factors stir-
723 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (dismissing prisoner liberty interest claim arising out of eleven
months in segregated confinement, despite defendants "concedtingj there was no evi-
dence to support the disciplinary decision."); Leslie, 896 F. Supp. at 772,774 (dismissing on
summary judgment prisoner claim asserting liberty interest arising out of placement in
segregated confinement, despite finding that prison superintendent "had gratuitously
placed (plaintiff) in segregative confinement for no reason at all").
248 See supra notes 133-144 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 161-202 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 161-202 and accompanying text.
251 See infra notes 252-255 and accompanying text.
252 See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
283 See id.
284 Sec id. at 486-87.
255 See supra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
256 Sec supra notes 203-233 and accompanying text.
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rounding the Sandhi plaintiff's segregation, these circuits have held
that Sandin in fact should be read as calling for a case by case inquiry
that examines the duration of confinement, whether the confinement
affects the prisoner's overall sentence, and most significantly, the
conditions in both administrative confinement and the prison's gen-
eral population.257 It is nevertheless arguable that, from a textual
viewpoint, the D.C. and Second Circuits, no more than the other cir-
cuits, are not following the true intent of the Sandhi Court, as that
decision at no point outlined a direction for future courts to proceed
with factual analyses.258
Putting aside the problem of the true intent of Sandhi for a mo-
ment, it is worth pointing out the dramatic differences that occur when
adjudicating a prisoner's due process claim in a jurisdiction that utilizes
administrative confinement as the proper comparative baseline and a
jurisdiction that does not. 259 In 1997, in Griffin v. 'Vaughn, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in rejecting the claim that a prisoner
possessed a liberty interest against being placed in administrative
confinement for fifteen months, cited Sandia for the principle that
administrative confinement should be the comparative baseline in
making liberty interest analyses. 28° The Griffin court pointed to nothing
objective to support its reasoning that administrative confinement was
typical of prison life based on the frequency of its application in that
particular prison.28i Instead, the court made more explicit what the
Sandin. Court had not: that typicality can be inferred if such
confinement is used by prison officials for a wide range of prison goals,
regardless of how often it is applied. 282 The Griffin court essentially ap-
proved of how administrative confinement, as dictated in the state
regulations, could be applied in a variety of ways, and, because of this
approval, "conclude [d] with confidence" that many months in adminis-
trative confinement were "not uncommon."288 Although the court dis-
257 See supra notes 203-233 and accompanying text.
25° See 515 U.S. at 485-87.
256 Sec infra notes 260-271 and accompanying text.
26° See Giffin, 112 F.3d 703,706 (3d Cir. 1997).
26' See id. at 703-09.
Sec id. at 708.
262 See id. It is ironic that the Griffin court cited Sandin, which instructed courts to focus
on harm and not the language of codified law, and proceeded to infer "typicality" from a
facial reading of state regulations listing the various ways administrative confinement could
be applied. See id. Consistent with the Sandal, Court, however, the Griffin court did not con-
sider objectively if fifteen months of detention was atypical compared to the average prison
experience or the average placement in administrative confinement. See id. at 703-09.
2004]	 Sandia v. Conner and Infropison Confinement 	 457
cussed the conditions within administrative confinement, it made no
attempt to highlight the differences between these conditions and the
conditions in general population . 264
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision in
1999 in Welch v. Bartlett takes an opposite approach, and the differing
results are glaringly apparent. 265
 Faced with a prisoner's appeal of a
district. court's grant of summary judgment to prison officials based
on a liberty interest claim arising out of ninety days spent in discipli-
nary confinement, the Welch court vacated and remanded for further
factfinding.266 Essentially, the Welch court expressed that it needed
more information about whether it was typical for inmates nal being
disciplined (i.e., in administrative confinement and in general popu-
lation) to spend similar periods in similar circumstances within that
prison.267 The district court in Welch actually made objective findings
as to the length of the plaintiff's confinement sentence compared to
the length of a typical sentence within that prison, and ruled that a
ninety-day sentence was not atypical. 268 On review, however, the Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that the lower court erred by failing to take
into account the typicality of a ninety-day sentence as compared to the
types and frequencies of sentences imposed on prisoners not only re-
ceiving disciplinary sentences, but also on prisoners in administrative
confinement, and general population. 269 Thus, the Welch court.
reaffirmed the Second Circuit's interpretation that the central teach-
ing of Sandia was an analysis that calls for an evaluation of conditions
in both administrative confinement and general population. 270
 The
above comparison indicates that, if the Welch plaintiff had brought his
claim in the Third Circuit, the likely result would have been summary
judgment for the prison officials, whereas if the Griffin plaintiff had
pleaded in the Second Circuit, the likely result would have been at
least a remand, with a probable finding of a liberty interest. 27 I
Although the vagaries of the Sandhi decision make it impossible
to know how the Supreme Court intended for future due process
analyses to proceed, there is nothing explicit in the decision that indi-
2" See id. at 706-07.
285 See 196 F.3d 389,394-95 (2d Cir. 1999); infra notes 266-271 and accompanying text.
288
	 196 F.3d at 394-95.
267 See id. at 393-94.
26a Id. at 392.
288 See id. at 394.
278 See id. at 393-94.
271 See supra notes 260-270 and accompanying text.
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cates that an extremely narrow interpretation of liberty interests was
intended. 272 In addition, the Court failed to indicate how much
weight future courts should attribute to conditions in administrative
confinement, as compared to conditions in general population or to
the effect a sentence might have on an inmate's overall duration in
prison.273 Perhaps, then, criticism should be shared both by the Su-
preme Court for not clarifying its terms and by the majority of lower
federal courts, which have restricted the liberties of inmates inappro-
priately.274 Such courts have either concluded that, post-Sandin, ad-
ministrative confinement cannot lead to a liberty interest, or that
Sandia calls for an analysis which accepts that the challenged condi-
tions of confinement should be compared to conditions in adminis-
trative confinement alone. 275 Such an analysis will only in exceptional
circumstances find that placement in confinement imposes a mean-
ingful impairment of prisoners' liberty interests. 279 First, the condi-
tions of disciplinary confinement are usually similar to, if.not the
same as, conditions in administrative segregation. 277 Second, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's language implied that administrative segregation
is norma1.279 Logically, then, neither a sentence to disciplinary
confinement nor placement in administrative segregation could be
atypical, thereby raising a liberty interest. 279
The use of administrative confinement as an indicator of what is
typical of prison life, or as a comparative baseline in a Sandia analysis,
is suspect for two reasons. 280 First, a sentence to segregatory
confinement is not typical of the normal inmate experience. 281 Sec-
ond, the effects of multiple hours in isolated confinement should not
272 See supra notes 133-144 and accompanying text.
275 See Sandia, 515 U.S. at 486-87.
274 Sec suprei notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
276 See infra notes 277-279 and accompanying text.
277 See C0RRECI1ONS YEARBOOK. supra note 135, at 39 (national survey describing that
inmates in administrative segregation are kept separate from other inmates, their move-
ment from place to place within an institution is usually restricted, their privileges are re-
stricted, and higher levels of security procedures are used to manage them," and describ-
ing disciplinary segregation as "similar to Administrative Segregation except inmates are
placed for a fixed amount of time").
278 Sec Sandia, 515 U.S. at 486.
279 See supra notes 277-278 and accompanying text.
295 See infra notes 281-282 and accompanying text.
281 Sec infra notes 284-313 and accompanying text.
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be considered "[in]significant."282
 This Note next discusses each of
these arguments separately. 283
A. Typicality
Both the Supreme Court's implication and lower court holdings
that administrative confinement is typical of prison life should be
criticized first from an evidentiary viewpoint.284 The Saudis Court
failed to present any objective findings describing how often such
confinement was imposed or what. percentage of Hawaii prisoners
were placed in administrative segregation during their sentences. 285
On the contrary, Chief Justice Rehnquist. said little about administra-
tive confinement. 286 It is arguable that, given Sandin's overall policy of
providing greater institutional flexibility to prison officials, the Court
used administrative segregation as its principal comparative baseline
because administrative confinement is a tool such officials utilize for
many necessary non-punitive purposes. 287 This type of reasoning,
however, does not rely on what is objectively typical of the prisoner's
experience, but what the Court envisioned as typical based on its vi-
sion of a well-run prison. 288 Like the Saudin Court, most subsequent
courts have also avoided an inquiry into what is objectively typical in a
given prisoner's prison. 289
 But that analysis begs the question: Does
the simple fact. that officials can use administrative confinement for a
variety of purposes make such confinement exemplary of the average
prisoner's experience? 2"
The use of administrative confinement as a marker of what is
typical of prison life is also suspect because, to the contrary, a brief
investigation suggests that general-population conditions, not condi-
tions in administrative confinement., truly represent typical prison
life.28 i Such an investigation indicates that if Sandia is to be followed
282 See infra notes 314-333 and accompanying text.
288 See infra notes 284-333 and accompanying text.
284 See infra notes 285-290 and accompanying text,
288 SW 515 U.S. at 472-88.
286 See id.; see also Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3E1 846, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("To
be sure, Sandin nowhere directly explains why it used administrative segregation as the com-
parative baseline.").
287 See 515 U.S. at 482-83.
288 See id.
289 Sec supra notes 161-202 and accompanying text.
288 Sec supra notes 161-202 and accompanying text.
281 See infra notes 293-313 and accompanying text.
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from an objective perspective, any due process analysis needs to in-
corporate conditions of the general population, 292
It is concededly difficult to state conclusively the likelihood of the
"average" prisoner being placed in administrative segregation during
a sentence. to prison, largely because only a minority of prisons col-
lects data recording events of prisoner misconduct, and an even
smaller number maintains data indicating the prison's response to
such behavior.293 There is data, however, that supports the notion that
segregatory confinement is not the norm for a regular prisoner. 294
One recent national survey of state prisons found that the average
percentage of inmates housed in non-punitive confinement on a
given day was approximately four percent. 295 Another study from 1995
reported that less than one percent of prisoners held in federal jails
and prisons were found residing in segregation. 296 Although these
studies do not tell us what percentage of the average prison popula-
tion passes through these more restrictive placements in a given sen-
tence, the simple fact that most prisons are not dominated by restric-
tive confinements supports the proposition that the majority of
prisoners spend their lives in prison in conditions that resemble the
general population. 297 If non-punitive segregation is what is typical of
prison life, one would expect the numbers from these studies to be
much larger. 298
Webster's New World Dictionary defines "atypical" as "not charac-
teristic; abnormal."299 If one accepts the argument that conditions in
general population are, from an objective viewpoint, typical of the eve-
ryday prison existence, then placement in administrative confinement
certainly meets this definition.") Such placements resemble "prisons
within a prison," with near-total solitary confinement, oftentimes for
292 See infra notes 293-313 and accompanying text.
295 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE. STATISTICS, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONS INFORMATION
SYSTEMS 40-41 (1998).
294 See CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK, Supra note 135, at 38-39; MATS & WINFREE, supra note
135. at 206 n.30.
ria. See CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK, supra note 135, at 38-39. The survey has been con-
ducted since 1994, using data representing conditions on January 1 of a given year. Id.
296 See MAYS & WINER EE, supra note 135, at 20611.30.
297 See CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK, supra note 135, at 38-39; MAYS WINFREE, supra note
135, at 206 n.30.
298 See CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK, supra note 135, at 38-39; MAYS WINFREE, supra note
135, at 206 n.30.
299 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF TIIE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 90 (2d ed. 1980).
39° See MAYS R WINFREE, supra note 135, at 197-98.
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twenty-three hours a day. 381
 Prisoners in administrative confinement.
cannot work and have minimal access to educational opportunities or
other privileges available to prisoners in general population.S 02 When
allowed to leave their cells for bathing and exercise, such prisoners
must be escorted by prison guards while handcuffed and shackled.80 In
Sandin, Justice Breyer, in his dissent, noted that, absent Conner's disci-
plinary sentence, he, like the other general population prisoners,
would have "left his cell and worked, taken classes, or mingled with
others for eight hours each day."304 Instead, Conner found himself in a
situation where he could leave his cell for fifty minutes each day and
could talk to no one. 308 Such a sentence surely marked a change that
was uncharacteristic or abnormal when compared to what Conner ex-
perienced in general population." 8
The fundamental distinction between conditions in segregation
and conditions in general population becomes more apparent when
faced with the fact that the conditions in Hawaii's punitive and non-
punitive segregatory cells were almost identical. 307 The same SHU
housed prisoners sentenced both to disciplinary' confinement and to
administrative segregation, and the Court noted that. substantially
similar conditions applied to prisoners placed in either status. 308 In
addition, inmates housed in administrative confinement experienced
largely indistinguishable privilege revocations as compared to the
prisoners sentenced to disciplinary segregation. 309 This similarity be-
tween the conditions in disciplinary segregation and administrative
confinement is also present in most other prisons across the nation. 310
This demonstrates that life in general population, not placement in
segregation, is a better barometer of what is typical of a prisoner's ex-
perience.8" In actuality, the differences between the lack of liberty
afforded to all segregated inmates, regardless of the purpose, and
"1 See id.
303 Id. at 197.
303 Id. at 198.
sol 515 U.S. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
so Sec id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"6 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
397 Sec id. at 476 n.2, 486.
308 Id. at 476 n.2.
"9 Sandia, 515 U.S. at 476 n.2. Prisoners in administrative segregation received one
extra phone call and one extra visiting privilege" as compared with prisoners held in disci-
plinary confinement, Id.
310 See CORRECTIONS YEARIPOOK, supra note 135, at 39.
911 See supra notes 299-310 and accompanying text,
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what is afforded to those in general population, are very substantia1. 3"
Viewing these differences, it is indeed "ironic" that the Supreme
Court's primary comparison in deciding what is typical requires (or
has been interpreted as requiring) a comparison between the
confinement at issue and a prison's administrative confinement." 3
B. Sign ificance
By primarily emphasizing the similarities between administrative
and disciplinary confinement, the Sandhi Court concluded that a sen-
tence to disciplinary confinement did not produce a significant dis-
ruption in the plaintiffs overall experience in prison." 4 Most courts
interpreting the Sandin decision have not addressed whether the ef-
fects of solitary confinement should be considered significant enough
to raise Due Process Clause protection for a prisoner. 3 " One com-
mentator has noted that such an approach will necessarily invite a
merging of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment analyses as applied to
prisoners. 3 " The inattention to the word "significant" is unfortunate
for two reasons, both of which demonstrate why placement in
confinement should not be considered an insignificant event. 3 t 7 The
first reason relates specifically to how a sentence to disciplinary
confinement as compared to administrative confinement can
uniquely and powerfully transform one's overall prison experience, 318
whereas the second reason relates to the debilitating and harmful ef-
fects inherent in any sentence to solitary confinement." 9
312 See supra notes 299-310 and accompanying text.
313 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois mentioned this irony in
1995 in Leslie v. Doyle:
It is ironic that the Court's principal comparison is between prisoners in dis-
ciplinary segregation and those in administrative segregation rather than
a comparison with the vast majority of the inmates, who make up what is most
commonly called the "general population" and who are not subjected to any-
thing resembling the constraints imposed on prisoners in the segregation
units.... [T]he differences between the lack of liberty afforded to segregated
inmates and what is afforded to those in general population are very substan-
tial .
896 F. Stipp. at 773 n.4.
3" See 515 U.S. at 486.
313 See supra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
316 See Herman, supra note 28, at 1261.
317 See infra notes 318-329 and accompanying text.
318 Sec infra notes 320-324 and accompanying text.
319 Sec infra notes 325-329 and accompanying text.
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First, a conclusion that a sentence to disciplinary confinement
produces insignificant deprivations of a prisoner's liberty should be
criticized for ignoring the considerable dissimilarities between admin-
istrative and punitive confinement. in terms of the effects each respec-
tive sentence may have on a prisoner's existence in prison. 320 In con-
trast to administrative confinement, a sentence to disciplinary
segregation based on a finding of misconduct can potentially lessen a
prisoner's chance of parole. 321 Moreover, a sentence to disciplinary
confinement can negatively affect a prisoner's privileges, such as in-
prison employment, transfer requests, work release, and furlough op-
portunities.322 Only by looking beyond these facts could the Court
draw the conclusion that a sentence to disciplinary confinement did
not cause a "major disruption" in the plaintiffs prison environ-
meni. 323 Dismissing a sentence to disciplinary confinement as in-
significant glances over the truth that such a sentence meaningfully
touches all aspects of a prisoner's life. 324
Second, and perhaps more important, is the devastating harm
that prolonged solitary confinement can have on prisoners. 325 Studies
on the secondary effects of isolation housing on prisoners reveal evi-
dence of increased psychiatric complaints, suicide, self-mutilation, and
violence toward others, along with a variety of harmful psychological
effects,326
 A recent survey of the conditions of confinement within New
York state prisons revealed that officials at one prison were worried
about a "phenomenon" they described as "toxic SHU syndrome"—the
debilitating psychological effects prisoners experienced from living for
years in isolation.327 One inmate who spent two years in solitary
confinement for drug use told the New York state examiners:
520 Sec Belbot, supra note 40. at 59.
”I See id. at 57-58; see also Sandia, 515 U.S. 472 at 489 (Ginsburg. J.. dissenting); Haw.
Admin. Rule § 23-700-33(h) (1983) (providing that sentences to disciplinary confinement
are taken into account in parole decisions).
322 See Belboi, stop', note 40, at 59-60.
s2S See Sandia, 515 U.S. at 486; Belbot, supra note 40, at 59-60.
324 See Belbot, supra note 40, at 59-60.
323 See infra notes 326-329 and accompanying text.
328
 Sec Haney & Lynch, supra note 135, at 529-30 ("Direct studies of the effects of
prison isolation have documented a wide range of harmful psychological effects, including
increases in negative attitudes and affect, insomnia, anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hypersensi-
tivity, rtninations, cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of control, aggression, rage.
paranoia, hopelessness, lethargy, depression, emotional breakdowns, self-mutilation, and
suicidal impulses.").
327 See CORREC'llON ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, STATE 01"111E PRISONS: CONDITIONS or
CONFINEMENT IN TWENTY-FIVE CORR ECT/ONAI, FACILITIES 14 (2002).
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It is hard for people on the outside to understand the abso-
lute despondency that begins to invade your spirit after being
confined in a cage like an animal, when a deeper part of you
knows that this isn't why you were born—it wasn't what you
were meant to be. After months of deprivation and isolation
in the hole, the one thing that's easiest to lose is your human-
ity. You have to distance yourself from your feelings, because
to feel means to hurt, and hurting is what you've been run-
ning from all along. It leaves you walking through life like a
zombie. Everything becomes empty and meaningless. 328
Describing the effects of sustained isolation as "emotionally, physi-
cally, and psychologically destructive," Human Rights Watch has con-
cluded that "state and federal corrections departments are operating
facilities in ways that violate basic human rights." 329
Prior to Sandin, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1974 in Wolff v.
McDonnell indicated that the imposition of solitary confinement was a
significant enough event in a prisoner's life to require due process
protection.33° Since Sandin and its failure to discuss the effects of soli-
tary confinement, however, the lower courts have also largely ignored
such concerns in their Fourteenth Amendment prisoner discus-
sions. 331 It is the rare exception when the effects of such confinement
are considered during a Sandia analysis, with most of these examples
coming from courts establishing or following Second Circuit prece-
dent. 332 Given the demonstrated effects of such confinement, it is sur-
528 Id. at 15-16.
929 Sec Out of Sight: SupeOlaximum Security Confinement in the United States, Hum. WIN.
WATcri, Feb. 1, 2000, at 1, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/supermax/
Sprmx002.htm#P40_391.
350 Sec 418 U.S. 539. 571 n.19 (1974); see also supra note 17.
331 See supra notes 150-233 and accompanying text.
352
	
example, the U.S. Court of appeals for the Second Circuit in 2000 in Colon y.
Howard concluded that 305 days in disciplinary confinement raised a liberty interest. 215
F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cu.• 2000). The court stated:
Since we can anticipate continuing litigation in this area as the Sandia stan-
dard is given further content, we think it appropriate to advise the district
courts of this Circuit that in cases challenging SHU confinements of dura-
tions within the range bracketed by 101 days and 305 days, development of a
detailed record will assist appellate review. For instance, the parties might pre-
sent evidence of the psychological effects of prolonged confinement in isola-
tion and the precise frequency of SHU confinements of varying durations.
Id.; see also Lee v. Coughlin. 26 F. Stipp. 2d 615, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (crediting testimony of
doctor who testified that prisoners exposed to periods of solitary confinement Inevitably
suffer severe psychological pain" and holding that a prisoner's placement in disciplinary
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prising that most courts have been reluctant to view such sentences as
effecting significant harms on prisouers. 333
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner to direct
prisoner liberty interest analyses away from positive law and toward an
approach that focuses on the nature of the deprivation suffered by
the prisoner was in some ways a helpful development. Prior to Sandhi,
confinement for 376 days gave rise to a liberty interest). Likewise, in 1998 in AlcCiary Lt. Kelly,
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York held that a prisoner's placement
in administrative confinement for over four years created a liberty interest, stating:
For purposes of Sandin, this Court need not and will not decide whether a
specific, independent psychiatric 'syndrome" exists with respect to the psy-
chopathological effects of prolonged SHU confinement. A conclusion, how-
ever, that prolonged isolation from social and environmental stimulation in-
creases the risk of developing mental illness does not strike this Court as
rocket science.
4 F. Stipp. 2d 195, 208, 210-11 (W.D.N.Y 1998).
333 Sec supra notes 150-233 and accompanying text. Perhaps the next major test for
Sandin in the intraprison confinement context will come in a challenge to so-called "sit-
permax" prisons, which are free standing, super security prisons designed to hold a state's
most dangerous prisoners and which presently exist in at least thirty-four states. Sec Leena
Kurki & Norval Morris, The Proposes, Practices, and Problems of Supermax Prisons, 28 CRIME &
jusT. 385, 387-88 (2001). Sentences at supermaxes are notable for their long-term,
indefinite" periods of confinement that are "measured in years rather than in 'aloud's" and
consist of "nearly complete isolation and deprivation of environmental stimuli," including
the almost total absence of organized activities. Id. at 388-90. Applying a Sandhi analysis to
placement in such a setting is theoretically problematic. as many stpermaxes do not con-
sist of classified living arrangements such as "administrative confinement," "disciplinary
segregation," or "general population." Sec id. at 388; supra notes 135-139 and accompany-
ing text. In addition, because many inmates have been transferred initially to supermaxes
from lower-security prisons, most prisoner claims so far have focused on challenging such
transfers; thus, many courts hearing such claims have refused to enter into even a cursory
discussion of Sandhi, given that it is established law that intoprison transfers cannot raise
liberty interests. See, e.g., Horton v. Thompson, No. 02-00470-C, 2002 WL 32350051, at *4
(W.D. Wis. Apr. 1, 2002) (quoting Meachum y. Fano, 427 U.S. 215. 225 (1976)). One court
has recently held, hosvever, in a class-action prisoner snit, that the conditions at an Ohio
state supermax were atypical and significant, noting that the prisoners there were held in
twenty-three-hour-a-day solitary confinement with almost a complete lack of human con-
tact, with the vast majority of inmates at the prison housed in such a situation for a Mild-
11111/11 of at least two years. Sec Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Stipp. 2d 719, 740-42 (N.D. Ohio
2002). The Austin court issued its ruling after finding that such conditions were dramati-
cally more severe than the conditions most prisoners held in Ohio's other high-security
prisons faced. Sec id. Given the existence of a liberty interest, the court then ruled that the
process of both sending prisoners to, and keeping them at, the supermax violated the Due
Process Clause. Sec id. at 747-49. The case is currently on appeal before the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Sec Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Litigation Docket: Prison Conditions
4.9' Policies (Oct. 13, 2003), at http://www.achmhio.org/docket/docket.hun#pc.
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federal courts became overburdened with prisoner litigation due to
both the rising number of prisoners and Wolff v. McDonnell's focus on
rights inherent in positive law. Thus, on one level the Sandin decision
can be seen as addressing a need for a method by which courts could
dismiss the more dubious prisoner Fourteenth Amendment claims
before they took up valuable judicial resources. In the area of intra-
prison confinements, however, Sandin has resulted in extreme results:
presently, in most federal courts there is no due process protection
available for prisoners who are placed in solitary confinement, often
for indefinite periods, after being accused of breaking prison rules or
being classified as dangerous by prison officials. Because such assign-
ments are not typical of the everyday prison experience and because
solitary confinement has been shown to cause severe psychological
damage to those who experience it, the Sandin "atypical and
significant" standard should not preclude courts from examining
whether such prisoners received a minimum of due process in their
intraprison sentence.'An approach that objectively takes into consid-
eration what is typical of the overall prison experience and seriously
considers the harms of solitary confinement is both more faithful to
the language of Sandin and assures that those who face such
confinement are placed there with a modicum of fairness. Such an
approach would continue to prevent frivolous claims from surviving
the motion to dismiss and, at the same time, would ensure that prison
officials are not administering sentences to segregatory confinement
in their prisons arbitrarily.
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